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Glossary of Abbreviations  
ACS American Colonisation Society 
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia 
AFRICOM US Africa Command 
AOAV Action on Armed Violence  
APMBC Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention  
AP Anti-personnel 
AXO Abandoned Explosive Ordnance  
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
ERW Explosive Remnants of War 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
LNP Liberia National Police 
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
MoD Ministry of National Defense  
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia  
MoJ Ministry of Justice  
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OOL Operation Onward Liberty 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General  
SSR Security Sector Reform  
ToT Training of Trainers 
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
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Executive Summary  
Introduction  
This case study forms part of a broader GICHD study on national capacities and residual 
contamination and is based on both desk-top research and findings from a GICHD mission to 
Liberia in March 2014. A full list of meetings held during that mission is available in Annex I.  
 
The purpose of this report is to document Liberia’s experience of developing national clearance 
capacities to address residual contamination, and to identify and present good practices and 
lessons learnt. National capacities and residual contamination study terms of reference are 
available in Annex II. 
 
Liberia faces explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination as a result of two distinct internal 
conflicts:  
1. The first phase, frequently referred to as the “Liberian Civil War”, started in late 1989 
when the head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor, started a 
rebellion against Samuel Doe’s government, and ended with Taylor’s victory in the 1997 
elections. 
2. The second phase, also known as the “Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) insurrection”, 
started in 1999 when two rebel groups challenged Taylor’s rule: the LURD from its base 
in Guinea in the north and the MODEL, based in Cote d’Ivoire in the east. It ended in 
2003, when Taylor’s government, LURD and MODEL signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA).  
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)  
The UN Security Council established UNMIL in September 2003 through Resolution 1509.1 The 
resolution mandates the mission to assist with maintaining law and order in Liberia. At its peak it 
consisted of up to 15,000 UN military personnel and up to 1,115 UN police officers.  More 
specifically, the resolution mandates UNMIL to undertake a number of tasks related to Security 
Sector Reform (SSR), including assisting Liberia’s transitional government with:  
1. Monitoring and restructuring the Liberian police force, consistent with democratic 
policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the 
training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and 
interested states.    
2. Forming a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, 
international organizations and interested states.  
 
Since its establishment UNMIL has been responsible for responding to hazardous threats 
throughout Liberia, and for carrying out explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in the management 
of residual contamination. EOD activities were not reflected in early versions of the transition 
plan, resulting in the subsequent request for UNMAS assistance. The transition plan foresees 
that, by 2015, UNMIL military capacity will be reduced to one engineering unit with EOD 
capacities, and stipulates that EOD responsibilities should be handed over by UNMIL to the AFL 
in June 2015. 
                                               
 
1
 UN Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Liberia%20SRes1509.pdf  
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United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
A 2011 internal UNMIL gap assessment identified the need to develop a national EOD capacity 
in Liberia, given the gradual reduction of UNMIL troops and the resulting decline in EOD 
capacity. On this basis, UNMIL requested support from UNMAS for transitioning the EOD 
response from UNMIL to national security services.  
UNMAS conducted an assessment mission in 2012, looking into the feasibility of an UNMAS 
programme in Liberia. As a result of the assessment findings and in response to UNMIL’s 
request, UNMAS established a project in mid-2013 with the objective of training 32 AFL 
members as EOD operators. UNMAS activities in Liberia supported UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 2066 (2012) and 2116 (2013) and UNMIL’s transition plan. This includes 
specific activity related to transferring EOD capacities to national entities.  
Capacity development initiatives 
It was only when UNMAS established its presence in Liberia in 2013 that activities related to 
developing national clearance capacities truly started, even though significant training which 
targets the AFL had been underway in Liberia for several years. The principal UNMAS objective 
in Liberia was to train 32 personnel from the AFL engineering unit in EOD. To achieve this, 
UNMAS contracted the international non-governmental organisation (NGO) Action on Armed 
Violence (AOAV) as an implementing partner to supply EOD trainings. After successfully 
completing training, a second batch of 16 intermediate level EOD-certified AFL operators 
graduated in March 2014, and the target of 32 qualified EOD operators was reached. 
 
UNMAS, through AOAV, implemented training-of-trainers (ToT) courses with the Liberia National 
Police (LNP). This recognises the visibility and presence of the LNP in rural areas and that it 
regularly receives hazardous reports directly from the public. This training focused on ERW 
identification, reporting and risk education. The long-term plan was that these modules should 
be mainstreamed into the LNP training curriculum, to ensure future sustainability.  
 
Key Findings: Good Practices, Main Challenges and Lessons Learnt  
Good practices 
The Liberian experience of developing national clearance capacities highlights several good 
practices and draws attention to a number of challenges.  Good practices include: 
 
National commitment  
A certain level of national commitment is a prerequisite for any successful capacity development 
initiative. Liberia illustrates a high level of commitment to, and interest in, greater involvement in 
addressing ERW contamination on behalf of key national stakeholders, including the AFL and 
the LNP. It appears that both the AFL and the LNP clearly recognise their respective 
responsibilities for addressing residual contamination and that they are keen to take on the 
responsibilities, gaining new knowledge and skills to do so in the most effective manner.  
 
Proactive response from UNMAS  
The response of UNMAS to a specific issue and request and their proactive initiative to broaden 
the initial focus of training 32 EOD operators, exploring accompanying structures and 
procedures, is commendable, including the focus on reporting and developing policies and MoU. 
Several international and national actors in Monrovia emphasised the instrumental role that the 
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presence of UNMAS has had in highlighting issues related to ERW contamination and the need 
to develop national capacities to manage it.  
 
National stakeholders, national ownership and sustainability 
As mentioned above, UNMAS and AOAV provide capacity development support to already 
established national structures. The common challenge of transitioning responsibilities from a 
UN-managed mine action programme, to a nationally managed programme has therefore never 
been an issue in Liberia. In addition, the explicit effort of UNMAS to identify ‘local solutions to 
local problems’, while taking context-specific issues into account, has been underlined and is 
clearly appreciated by several informants.  
 
Information management  
A clear understanding of the problem at hand is a precondition for predicting what future 
challenges may be, and what national capacities will be needed to address them.  
While there have been some challenges regarding managing EOD-related information within 
UNMIL, the way in which external actors recognised these and subsequently reacted in a 
proactive manner deserves specific mention. Identification of shortfalls in available EOD 
information resulted in an UNMAS decision to fund an AOAV intern to conduct further analysis of 
UNMIL data. Greater clarity was created on the extent, nature and geographical location of ERW 
contamination.  
Effective collaboration  
Effective collaboration between national actors (Ministry of National Defense (MoD), AFL and 
LNP) and international actors (UNMIL, UNMAS, AOAV and Operation Onward Liberty (OOL) 
etc.) as well as among international actors has clearly resulted in useful information-sharing and 
coordination. This, in turn, has had a positive impact on capacity development activities.  
 
Main challenges and lessons learnt  
Most challenges presented below are not unique to Liberia’s capacities to address residual 
contamination. They are broader issues that the country faces as a consequence of its long civil 
war. These affect the Liberian state-building process in several ways.  Specific challenges in the 
Liberian context include: 
 
UNMIL – missed opportunity?  
UNMIL has been responsible for EOD since its establishment in 2003. Lack of detailed EOD 
data prior to 2012 means there is limited documentation of the nature and extent of 
contamination during these first eight years. Training and involving AFL and LNP in EOD-related 
activities was not an explicit aspect of UNMIL's mandate. Arguably, however, UNMIL missed a 
good opportunity to include national counterparts in EOD to a greater extent, in the interest of 
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Information management  
The LNP policy stipulates that reporting procedures and appropriate information management 
processes (including storage, analysis, sharing and reporting) will be important preconditions for 
any reporting structures to be effective. Effective information management will depend on solid 
collaboration and information-sharing between the key actors, including between AFL and LNP.  
 
Reporting structures 
Development of the LNP policy is an important first step; it allows for transparency and 
accountability regarding reporting structures, while stipulating the roles and responsibilities of the 
LNP and AFL. Potential future challenges relate to the actual adherence to, and implementation 
of, the policy. AOAV’s support in developing the LNP ToT plan was planned and implemented 
with sustainability in mind. The extent to which it will be implemented will, however, depend on 
available resources, the level of commitment and an effective chain of command.  
 
Future availability of resources  
Future availability, and effective and efficient management, of equipment and resources will be 
decisive in enabling effective deployment of AFL EOD capacities.  
 
Arms embargo 
Future EOD activities will rely on availability of necessary equipment, including explosives for 
demolition activities. Given the arms embargo imposed on Liberia, necessary explosives must 
be procured and safely stored in compliance with sanctions committee requirements.2 Some 
stakeholders expressed concern that it may be challenging for Liberia to do so in an effective 
and independent manner.  
 
Securing funding when working with national security services  
The UNMAS Liberia programme is unique in many ways, including its primary focus on capacity 
development of a national army. Working with security services is necessary in the transition 
context of Liberia, with UNMIL gradually reducing its presence and capacity. UNMAS has 
experienced great challenges in securing funding because it is working with the army. It 
perceives a great reluctance among donors to fund any activities that involve training security 
services. This reluctance represents a key challenge for successful implementation of similar 
projects in the future.  
  
                                               
 
2
 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1521/  
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Introduction 
Background to the study 
This case study forms part of a broader GICHD study on national capacities and residual 
contamination and is based on both desk-top research and findings from a GICHD mission to 
Liberia in March 2014. A full list of meetings held during that mission is available in Annex I.  
The purpose of this report is to document Liberia’s experience of developing national clearance 
capacities to address residual contamination, and to identify and present good practices and 
lessons learnt. National capacities and residual contamination study terms of reference are 
available in Annex II. 
Country context 
Liberia is situated in western Africa, bordering Sierra Leone to the west, Guinea Conakry to the 
north and Cote d’Ivoire to the east. The country covers an area of 111,369 km2 and has a 
population of about 3.7 million people.  
The creation of Liberia is linked with the abolition of slavery in the West, and the rapidly 
increasing population of free African-Americans in the United States (US). The American 
Colonisation Society (ACS) was formed in the early 1800s to look into possibilities of resettling 
African-Americans in Africa.3 Between 1821 and 1867 an estimated 10,000 freed slaves and 
thousands more that had been freed from slave ships were resettled in West Africa and founded 
the settlement Liberia, the “land of the free”. The Liberians formally declared their independence 
from the ACS in 1847, thereby creating the world’s first black republic.4  
Liberia’s government structure was heavily influenced by the US model. The capital was named 
Monrovia after the fifth US president, James Monroe, who was a prominent supporter of the 
colonisation. Americo-Liberians governed Liberia as a one-party state for the next 133 years, 
which left a distinct mark on the society, including in political and social structures, the patronage 
system and the segregationist policy.5 Following a coup d’état by an indigenous sergeant named 
Samuel Doe, Americo-Liberian rule came to an end in 1980. 
Origin, nature and scope of the mine/explosive remnants of war 
contamination problem 
Liberia faces explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination as a result of two distinct internal 
conflicts:  
1. The first phase, frequently referred to as the “Liberian Civil War”, started in late 1989 
when the head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor, 
started a rebellion against Doe’s government, and ended with Taylor’s victory in the 
1997 elections. 
                                               
 
3
 Human Rights Center, University of California, Talking Peace, 2011, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Publications_Talking-Peace_06-2011.pdf  
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Americo-Liberians rarely intermarried, membership of the only recognised party was limited to them, and Liberians 
who couldn’t prove “Congo” heritage (95% of the population) were excluded from serving in the government or military 
until the 1970s. Indigenous populations were not recognised as citizens until 1904.  
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2. The second phase, also known as the “Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) insurrection”, 
started in 1999 when two rebel groups challenged Taylor’s rule: the LURD from its 
base in Guinea in the north and the MODEL, based in Cote d’Ivoire in the east, and 
ended in 2003, when Taylor’s government, LURD and MODEL signed the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  
The impact of these two civil wars has been tremendous. The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) estimates that 250,000 people were killed and that one million were 
displaced.6 The TRC has pointed out that the nature and magnitude of atrocities committed, 
especially against women, girls and boys, by the various warring factions, including Government 
forces, were of “epic proportions”.7  







                                               
 
6
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Volume One: Preliminary Findings and Determinations, 2008,  
http://trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/volume-one_layout-1.pdf  
7
 Ibid.  
8
 http://www.mapsofworld.com/liberia/liberia-political-map.html  
12 | 31 
History of the process of developing national capacities  
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)  
The UN Security Council established UNMIL in September 2003 through Resolution 1509.9 The 
resolution mandates the mission to assist with maintaining law and order in Liberia. It consisted 
of up to 15,000 UN military personnel and up to 1,115 UN police officers at its peak, More 
specifically, the resolution mandates UNMIL to a number of tasks related to Security Sector 
Reform (SSR), including assisting Liberia’s transitional government with:  
1. Monitoring and restructuring the Liberian police force, consistent with democratic 
policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the 
training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and 
interested States.    
2. Forming a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, 
international organizations and interested states.  
In August 2012, key stakeholders, including the Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG), UNMIL, the MoD, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and 
Liberia National Police (LNP), organised a conference to develop a “roadmap to transition.” The 
resulting transition plan stipulates key activities for transitioning responsibilities from UNMIL to 
the Liberian government over the next three years (July 2012 – June 2015). The plan anticipates 
a reduction of troops from 8,000 in mid-2012 to a total of 3,500 by the end of June 2015.  
As part of the transition planning, relevant international and national stakeholders established a 
‘joint transition working group’, chaired by the MoD. This group meets on a bi-weekly or monthly 
basis to discuss issues related to UNMIL’s reduction in presence and the transition processes, 
and to update the transition plan, which is very much a ‘living document.’ 
 
Since its establishment UNMIL has been responsible for responding to hazardous threats 
throughout Liberia, and for carrying out explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in the management 
of residual contamination. EOD activities were not reflected in early versions of the transition 
plan, resulting in the subsequent request for UNMAS assistance. The transition plan foresees 
that, by 2015, UNMIL military capacity will be reduced to one engineering unit with EOD 
capacities, and stipulates that EOD responsibilities should be handed over by UNMIL to the AFL 
in June 2015. More information on the extent and nature of residual contamination and the EOD 
response will be presented below. 
Security Sector Reform  
The AFL and the LNP committed serious crimes against the civilian population during the 14-
years of civil war, resulting in little trust in the national security services. Recognising this, key 
stakeholders in the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) process acknowledged the importance 
of reforming the security sector. This was shown by the inclusion of SSR in the August 2003 
CPA.  
 
                                               
 
9
 UN Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Liberia%20SRes1509.pdf  
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) defines SSR as: “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet 
the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms 
and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but 
extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, 
intelligence and policing.”10 
The UN refers to SSR as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as 
monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of 
effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with 
full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”11 
Armed Forces of Liberia  
The CPA called for a restructuring of the AFL, requesting that the US would lead the process. 
Following consultations with the Liberian government, a programme of dismantling and 
rebuilding the AFL started in 2005. UNMIL has been in charge of reforming the LNP. AFL 
training activities, implemented by the US through the OOL mission, is one aspect of the 
significant SSR process that has been implemented in Liberia for nearly a decade.   
 
The RAND Corporation report titled Making Liberia Safe. Transformation of the National Security 
Sector 12  and commissioned by the Liberian and US governments, presented the strategic 
objectives and mission of the Liberian security forces. 
 
Stakeholders in Liberia agree that the AFL is the most appropriate institutional home for Liberia’s 
national EOD capacity. Stakeholders highlighted several reasons for this, including AFL’s current 
engineering capacity and available resources, including some equipment and financial 
resources.  
US support and Operation Onward Liberty  
The US military, the US State Department and the private company DynCorp conducted an 
exploratory mission to Liberia in spring 2004, looking into necessary steps regarding AFL 
reform.13 The initial DynCorp proposal stipulated training 2,000 men, supplementing their training 
with rule-of-law and human rights components, stressing the importance of respect for 
international humanitarian law and the law of war, separation of army and police responsibilities 
and the significance of civilian control of the military.14 DynCorp subsequently won the US State 
Department contract to demobilise the old AFL, rehabilitate three military bases and recruit, vet, 
train and equip a new AFL consisting of approximately 2,000 men and women. It is believed that 
DynCorp won the contract because it incorporated SSR components into its proposal. 15             
                                               
 
10
 www.oecd.org  
11
 The UN, DPKO, The UN SSR Perspective, May,  2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/pdf/securityreform.pdf  
12
 The RAND Corporation, Making Liberia Safe. Transformation of the National Security Sector, 2007, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG529.pdf  
13




 Ibid.  
15
 Ibid.  
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A principal challenge in DynCorp’s initial work was demobilising the AFL and the Ministry of 
National Defense.16  
When DynCorp’s contract ended in 2009, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), through US 
Marine Corps Forces Africa, established Operation Onward Liberty (OOL) to provide US military 
personnel for mentoring and training the AFL. The goal was to develop a professional and 
capable military force that could effectively provide and contribute to the overall security 
environment in Liberia.17    
The vetting aspect of the AFL training is regarded as a success; some experts claim it is the best 
they have witnessed anywhere in the world.18 The US has a long-standing history with the 
Liberian army; more than 5,000 US troops were stationed in Liberia during the Second World 
War and the US has been training the Liberian military since the 1950s. The US military 
mentorship programme consisted of 30 people as of March 2014 and the US has reportedly 
spent more than USD 300 million on training the AFL from 2004 to 2014.19 
The AFL became fully nationalised in February 2014 when Brigadier General Daniel Dee 
Ziankahn swore to defend Liberia’s constitution and fulfil his duties as the first Liberian Army 
Chief since the end of the 14-year civil war, replacing the outgoing Nigerian Army Chief.20 Many 
viewed the transition to a Liberian Army Chief as a key achievement in the capacity development 
effort.   
Liberia National Police  
While the US has been in charge of reforming and training the AFL, the CPA put UNMIL in 
charge of reforming and training the LNP. In contrast to the reform process which rebuilt the AFL 
from scratch, the LNP reform built on existing personnel, often from other security services. 
Whereas the AFL vetting process is regarded as a success and seen as a good practice 
internationally, UNMIL’s human rights and protection unit referred to the police version as a 
“failure” as early as 2005.21  
There is a general acknowledgement that the LNP lacks resources, including the most basic 
equipment, and that the force lacks management and strategic planning competencies and 
skills.  
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
A 2011 internal UNMIL gap assessment identified the need to develop a national EOD capacity 
in Liberia, given the gradual reduction of UNMIL troops and the resulting decline in EOD 
capacity. On this basis, UNMIL requested UNMAS support in transitioning the EOD response 
from UNMIL to national security services.  
UNMAS conducted an assessment mission in 2012, looking into the feasibility of an UNMAS 
programme in Liberia. Reflecting the findings of the assessment and responding to UNMIL’s 
                                               
 
16
 The ICG reports highlights that DynCorp’s work in 2006 predominantly focused on arranging the demobilisation 
payment for all 13,770 AFl soldiers and more than 400 MoD employees.   
17
 US Africa Command Fact Sheet, Operation Onward Liberty, October 2012, www.africom.mil/Doc/10032  
18
 International Crisis Group, ibid,   
19
 Al Jazeera. Too Small to Succeed? Liberia’s New Army Comes of Age, March 4, 2014, 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/4/too-small-to-succeedliberiasnewarmycomesofage.html  
20
 The Liberian Government requested that a Nigerian Army Officer served as the head of the AFL during the 
transitional period.  
21
 ICG, Ibid.  
15 | 31 
request, UNMAS established a project in mid-2013 with the objective of training 32 AFL 
members as EOD operators. UNMAS’ activities in Liberia supported UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 2066 (2012) and 2116 (2013) and UNMIL’s transition plan. This includes a 
specific activity related to transferring EOD capacities to national entities.  
It was only when UNMAS established its presence in Liberia in 2013 that activities related to 
developing national clearance capacities truly started, even though significant training which 
targets the AFL had been underway in Liberia for several years. The principal UNMAS objective 
in Liberia was to train 32 personnel from the AFL engineering unit in EOD. To achieve this, 
UNMAS contracted the international non-governmental organisation (NGO) Action on Armed 
Violence (AOAV) as an implementing partner to supply EOD trainings. After successfully 
completing training, a second batch of 16 intermediate level EOD-certified AFL operators 
graduated in March 2014, and the target of 32 qualified EOD operators was reached. 
Recognising the visibility and presence of LNP in rural areas and that it regularly receives 
hazardous reports directly from the public, UNMAS, through AOAV, implemented training-of-
trainers (ToT) courses with the LNP. The ToT training focused on ERW identification and 
reporting and risk education. Long-term these modules should be mainstreamed into the LNP 
training curriculum, to ensure future sustainability. This is explained in more detail below.  
Liberia’s SRSG informed UNMAS in August 2013 that it would not provide UNMAS with further 
funding after 30 June 2014. Anticipating future challenges in securing continued funding from 
other sources,  UNMAS staff decided to broaden project activities from the initial focus on 
training 32 EOD operators. Adoption of a more holistic approach was rooted in a wish to 
strengthen AFL’s capacities to safely and effectively manage residual contamination in the 
future.  As a result, additional activities included a focus on:  
 developing standard operating procedures (SOPs); 
 procuring explosives; 
 storing and accounting for explosives; and 
 operating in an embargo context. 
UNMAS programme staff underlined that OOL staff members’ support and collaboration were 
instrumental in the smooth establishment of the capacity development project. OOL contributed 
by connecting UNMAS with key AFL representatives. Though OOL’s mission did not focus 
specifically on developing AFL’s EOD capacity, UNMAS/AOAV and OOL cooperated in their 
capacity development activities.  
The desired end state of UNMAS activities in Liberia revolves around the following:22  
 sustainable national capacity exists within the AFL to safely manage ERW;  
 sustainable national capacity exists within the LNP to safely identify, secure, and report 
ERW items for disposal;  
 ERW reporting database exists and tracks recovery of items throughout Liberia; and 
 a sustainable capacity is supported by government institutions through inclusion in 
national budgets and national strategy documents such as the National Defence Strategy 
and National Military Strategy.  
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 UNMAS Liberia Programme website: http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/liberia  
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AOAV 
AOAV signed a contract with UNMAS in September 2013 to lead a nine-month project (October 
2013 – June 2014).23 Key responsibilities under this contract were to develop: 
 AFL’s EOD capacity (32 EOD intermediate level staff) to safely dispose of ERW; and 
 LNP’s ERW response and reporting capacity. 
The technical EOD training focused on the safe disposal of munitions routinely used by 
government and rebel forces, including mortars and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). This 
reflected the nature of contamination in Liberia, 
To promote sustainability of the EOD capacity, AOAV developed: 
 a training management package; 
 draft EOD standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the AFL; 
 training guidelines; and  
 an “EOD handbook”, summarising key messages. The handbook was handed over to 
AFL upon the closure of training activities in mid-2014.  
In terms of future plans, the proposal is to divide the 32 EOD-qualified personnel into five teams: 
two teams based in the Monrovia area and three at Gbarnga, the base for the 1st Engineering 
Company, in Bong County. One of the teams at Gbarnga will be responsible for training and 
maintaining equipment. Personnel will rotate between the two locations and be readily 
deployable. This plan has been shared with the Company Commander and was awaiting 
approval as of July 2014.  
Regarding the LNP initiative, UNMAS and AOAV promoted the inclusion of a two-day course on 
ERW identification and reporting in LNP’s staff training, taught by LNP instructors. The staff 
training consists of six months’ training at the Police Academy in Monrovia, followed by another 
six months of practical field placement in the counties, ending with two weeks at the Monrovia 
academy, before successful students graduate. The course, which will be included in the final 
two-week phase, focuses on the following responsibilities: 
 recognition and reporting; 
 securing the site; 
 sharing risk-related information with the public; and 
 informing the AFL.  
AOAV trained a total of nine LNP instructors in the first batch of training, and then mentored 
them when they in turn delivered the training to 291 new recruits and 51 in-service officers.  
Since then, an additional 31 instructors have been trained.  
In addition, AOAV produced 1,000 copies of an ERW Awareness Aide Memoire to be distributed 
to every LNP depot and station. This handbook included photographs of the most commonly 
encountered UXO and a report template to improve identification and reporting.   
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 UNMAS extended the initial nine-month contract by two months to 31 August 2014.  
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Addressing Residual Contamination  
Nature and extent of residual contamination 
Recognising the lack of detail in information summarising EOD activities carried out by UNMIL 
since its establishment in 2003, AOAV hired an intern in April 2014 to analyse UNMIL EOD 
statistics. Concerning the extent of residual contamination, the information reveals that UNMIL 
did a total of 261 “call outs” in 2012, 113 in 2013 and 60 in the first seven months of 2014.  
 
Information shared by UNMAS and AOAV, September 2014 
 
In addition to UNMIL’s activities, AFL carried out one EOD task in 2013 and nine in the first four 
months of 2014, a clear indication of its strengthened capacity to respond to and address 
residual contamination.  
AOAV’s analysis of Liberia’s residual contamination shows that UNMIL disposed of a total of 
47,011 items of small arms and ammunition and 3,256 items of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) 
between early 2012 and April 2014. It is important to note that many of these were not in fact 
UXO, but UNMIL’s logistics disposal of unserviceable/expired items that were recorded as 
UXO24. A further analysis of the recorded UXO shows that UNMIL disposed of a total of 109 
RPGs, 576 hand grenades and 2,509 Mortar Bombs. UNMIL recorded the remaining 62 items as 
‘other types.’   
                                               
 
24
 IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations defines logistics disposal as: ‘in the 
context of mine action, the term refers to ....the removal of munitions and explosives, from a stockpile utilising a 
variety of methods, (that may not necessarily involve destruction)’.IMAS 04.10, 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imas-international-standards/english/series-04/IMAS-
04-10-Ed2-Am2.pdf    
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The information further specifies the geographical locations of EOD activities, illustrating that 
Montserrado County (which includes the capital Monrovia) has had the highest concentration of 
reported hazards, with a total of 80 call outs in two and a half years.  
Liberia has no known landmines contamination. Liberia’s 2004 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) Article 7 report states:  
…our National Defence Policy has never permitted the purchase for inclusion in our inventories, 
Anti Personnel Mines (APMs). We want to report, however, that during the course of the 14-year 
civil crisis, ECOMOG, the intervening West African Force, did employ the use of APMs to a 
limited extent. Regrettably, that Force did not share any information with the Ministry of National 
Defense on the type and deployment area of the hardware used. 25 
As part of its capacity development support, UNMAS assisted the MoD with drafting its Article 7 
Report for 2013, in which no new AP landmines are reported.26 
 
Guiding framework   
As stated above, UNMAS and AOAV supported the LNP in developing its ERW identification 
and reporting capacity. As part of this effort, AOAV assisted the LNP with developing a policy on 
LNP Response and Reporting Procedures for Explosive Remnants of War (the LNP policy).27  
A first ‘policy working group’ meeting took place at the end of January 2014 in Monrovia, 
bringing several stakeholders together. The meeting focused on developing a policy on the 
LNP’s response and reporting of ERW. The purpose of the policy is to outline key aspects and to 
promote standardised and transparent procedures.  
The stated aim of the LNP policy is to: …outline the response and reporting procedures to be 
implemented by the LNP for the management of public safety surrounding incidents involving 
ERW across all counties in Liberia.  
The draft LNP policy categorises residual contamination found in Liberia into:  
 UXO;  
 abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO); 
 cached or stockpiled ammunition; and 
 explosive components of ammunition.  
A dedicated department within the LNP HQ will be the focal point for ERW with the intention that 
the reporting process will go through the national operations centre to ensure that the ERW focal 
point does not replicate an already existing structure. The ERW focal point will be housed within 
the Office of Public Safety at the LNP HQ. This recognises the importance of available resources 
and links to a number of community outreach programmes (thereby providing opportunities to 
deliver ERW awareness training alongside other outreach programmes). 
UNMAS was instrumental in promoting a series of meetings between the MoJ and the MoD in 
May 2014. The objective of these meetings was to develop a memorandum of understanding 
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 Liberia APMBC, 2004 Article 7 Report, http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/clearing-mined-
areas/Art7Report-Liberia-2004.pdf  
26
 Liberia APMBC 2013 Article 7 Report,  http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-
areas/Article7-Liberia-2014.pdf  
27
 Draft LNP Response and Reporting Procedures for Explosive Remnants of War (shared by AOAV in June 2014)  
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(MoU) regarding the national response to, and reporting of, the ERW problem in Liberia. Several 
stakeholders, including UNMAS and AOAV, had been pushing for this move for some time, 
recognising the importance of securing high-level government buy-in to the process.  
It is anticipated that the MoU will outline the division of responsibilities and the cooperative 
responsibilities between AFL and LNP.   
Reporting structures  
The LNP policy stipulates that the principles to be followed when responding to an ERW incident 
should be the same as during any other incidents managed by LNP (such as road traffic 
accidents, criminal activities or civil disorder), except as specifically noted in the policy. This is 
essential, as it clearly demonstrates the intention to mainstream residual contamination-related 
responsibilities into LNP’s every-day roles and responsibilities.  
The LNP policy also states that explicit approval/authority from command positions is not 
required. It further points out that LNP’s first task is to assess the potential threat and danger to 
the public. The findings of that assessment will determine the response priority and initial 
resource requirements.  
The policy presents three overarching principals: 
 Minimal Delay. Response timings, both reporting and clearance, must be based on the 
risk posed to the public by the item(s) of ERW. This threat must be initially assessed by 
the LNP first responder and first aid safety precaution taken. 
 Accuracy in Reporting. Supplementary safety precautions may be advised by the AFL 
EOD assets prior to their arrival at the incident location. To do so will require accurate 
descriptive reporting of the item, as well as situational detail and ancillary hazards.   
 Authority. It is implicit in the processes detailed in this policy that the LNP response to 
an ERW incident must be automatic in order to minimise delays in reporting and 
rendering safe, which would have the effect of extending an unacceptable risk to the 
public. This authority is vested in the first responder, through the chain of command for 
reporting, from the LNP HQ and allows LNP officers at all levels to enact the appropriate 
response. These are detailed later in this policy document. 
The policy states that the LNP, as the public’s ‘first defence’, will serve as recipient of all public 
information concerning ERW. It further underlines that ERW reports to appropriate authorities 
should be ‘accurate and timely’, and that any ‘delay in the reporting system might cause injury, 
death or property damage which in turn impairs the credibility of the LNP.’ 
The section below replicates the content of the LNP reporting format. 
Reporting Format 
The LNP ERW report form is divided into three main sections: 
1. Contact/dispatch detail 
o Date/time found/reported 
o Reporters (witness) name 
o Reporters contact details (address/phone numbers/coordinates/directions) 
o LNP contact details – station officer receiving the report 
 
2. Item detail 
o Item(s) reported, including: 
- description (size/shape/colour/condition) 
- location (if different to the reporters contact details) 
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o Hazard assessment – local factors affecting safety. The responding LNP Officer must 
attempt to assess the hazard the item(s) pose to the reporter and nearby members of 
the public and advise them of appropriate site safety precautions to implement prior 
to the arrival of an EOD team. In addition to the recognition points detail regarding 
shape, size, colour and condition, the location in relation to sensitive or vital 
equipment or infrastructure and hazards external to the item, i.e. fuel/gas storage, 
must be assessed and passed on through the reporting chain. 
o Local markings/protective measures, i.e. evacuation/barriers, undertaken 
o Recognition points. 
 
3. Tasking details 
o First  responder attendance at scene or remote, i.e. tele-report 
o Advice passed to the witness/reporter, e.g. first aide safety advice, cordon, 
evacuation, etc. 
o Date/time passed to LNP reporting chain 
o Assessed priority and reason 
o Confirmed AFL attendance/timings 
o Interim ERW identification (confirmed item identification to be advised by AFL EOD) 
 
A copy of the draft LNP ERW report form is available in Annex III.  
 
Reporting phases 
Phase I - Initial Contact 
LNP first responder: 
o Receives contact/item details or tasked by station/depot commander 
o Notes or logs dispatch information (e.g., address/location, time, date) 
o Verifies item is an ERW or suspicious, cordon the area and evacuate the public if 
required 
o Provides initial safety assessment/advice to contact, and remove items of 
external hazard (e.g., fuel, gas) if necessary 
o Logs information of the ERW (shape, size, colour, etc. ) and passes detail to 
station/depot commander 
o Implements additional safety requirements if advised by the AFL EOD team prior 
to their arrival  
o Remains on the scene until the arrival of the EOD team from the  AFL  
Station Commander: 
o Sets prioritisation and passed detail to LNP HQ (116) 
o Advises district/zone HQ 
o Initiates support requirements e.g. PSU/emergency services 
 
Phase II - Region Response 
District/Regional/Zone Commander: 
o Provides support requirements as requested 
o Confirms detail passed to LNP HQ  
o Processes written incident report to LNP HQ 
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Phase III - LNP HQ  
Office of Chief of Public Safety: 
o Passes item detail and priority assessment to AFL ERW liaison  
o Initiates supplementary support requirements, if requested 
o Receives initial feedback from AFL, i.e. confirmed safety assessment, additional 
support requirements and response timeline 
o Passes AFL response details/requirements to LNP incident commander 
o Maintains liaison with the AFL till the incident is resolved 
 
Reporting chain 
The reporting chain, as described in LNP’s policy document, builds on LNP’s existing chain of 
command and incident management procedures. The chain begins with the first police officer 
who receives information from the public either by phone or in person.  
This first contact by the public could also be made directly to a superior at HQs, but will in all 
instances result in an LNP officer on the ground being tasked to attend the reported location and 
verify that it is an ERW incident. This officer immediately alerts the nearest police command 
(zone, detachment, depot, detail). The commander in charge will deploy officers at the site, 
ensure public safety and inform the office of the Chief of Public Safety, which: 
 promulgates priority (24hr) contact details, including alternate contact details and the use 
of the radio room;  
 requests support from the AFL (J3 Operations); 
 briefs LNP HQ operations;  
 receives initial AFL feedback regarding response times and their support requirements;  
 authorises direct liaison between LNP incident commander and AFL EOD team leader;  
 maintains a database of all ERW incidents; and 
 receives and stores all written reports.  
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LNP ERW Management – Reporting Chain 28 
 
Information management  
EOD-related UNMIL information prior to 2009 is not available in a central data base. Five years’ 
worth of data is not, therefore, available for future analysis and reference.  
One issue in the UNMIL database post-2012 is that it does not differentiate between UXO, AXO 
and explosive ordnance (EO). As highlighted above, UNMIL has reported the logistics disposal29 
of its own expired/unserviceable EO as UXO which results in flawed data, as those items are not 
actual UXO. There are also examples of UNMIL assisting AFL with logistics disposal of its 
expired/ unserviceable stockpiled items, and then recording them as UXO.30 UNMAS and AOAV 
identified these problems, and gained some clarity through analysing UNMIL’s database.  
UNMAS noted that it has focused on the importance of making the distinction between range 
clearance and UXO on civilian property clear to AFL.  
AOAV’s information analysis initiative as outlined above has resulted in some interesting findings 
regarding the extent and nature of residual contamination. AOAV indicated that it will share all 
statistics with the MoD to allow the continued updating of information related to AFL’s EOD 
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 As presented in the LNP Policy  
 
30
 One such example shared with the GICHD dates back to early 2013, when AFL requested UNMIL to assist with 
destroying several thousand gas canisters.  UNMIL reported these items as UXO when in reality the AFL had asked 
UNMIL to remove an ammunition stockpile problem. 
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activities. As part of its training activities, AOAV has also focused on training the AFL EOD 
teams in reporting procedures, emphasising the importance of accurate and clear information.   
Sustainability  
Given that Liberia does not have a national mine action centre (MAC) or national mine action 
authority (NMAA), capacity development efforts have focused on existing structures that already 
have a budget line for EOD training/work. The MoD annual budget includes resources required 
for the EOD teams. Also, the Liberian National Defence Strategy incorporates EOD activities. 
Importantly, the MoD has confirmed that funding for logistical support to the EOD capacity is 
included in their 2015 draft budget; a clear indication of the national commitment to addressing 
residual contamination.31  
Liberia’s situation is distinct from most conventional mine/ERW action programmes, where 
MACs/NMAAs are established, frequently resulting in inflated structures that often face 
challenges in transitioning to national ownership.  
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 UNMAS Liberia Programme website, http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/liberia  
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Key Findings: Good Practices, Main Challenges and 
Lessons Learnt  
Good practices 
The Liberian experience of developing national clearance capacities highlights several good 
practices and draws attention to a number of challenges.  Good practices include: 
 
National commitment  
A certain level of national commitment is a prerequisite for any successful capacity development 
initiative. Liberia illustrates a high level of commitment to, and interest in, greater involvement in 
addressing ERW contamination on behalf of key national stakeholders, including the AFL and 
the LNP. It appears that both the AFL and the LNP clearly recognise their respective 
responsibilities for addressing residual contamination and that they are keen to take on the 
responsibilities, gaining new knowledge and skills to do so in the most effective manner.  
 
Proactive response from UNMAS  
The response of UNMAS to a specific issue and request and their proactive initiative to broaden 
the initial focus of training 32 EOD operators, exploring accompanying structures and 
procedures, is commendable, including the focus on reporting and developing policies and MoU. 
Several international and national actors in Monrovia emphasised the instrumental role that the 
presence of UNMAS has had in highlighting issues related to ERW contamination and the need 
to develop national capacities to manage it.  
 
National stakeholders, national ownership and sustainability 
As mentioned above, UNMAS and AOAV provide capacity development support to already 
established national structures. The common challenge of transitioning responsibilities from a 
UN-managed mine action programme, to a nationally managed programme has therefore never 
been an issue in Liberia. In addition, the explicit effort of UNMAS to identify ‘local solutions to 
local problems’, while taking context-specific issues into account, has been underlined and is 
clearly appreciated by several informants.  
 
Information management  
A clear understanding of the problem at hand is a precondition for predicting what future 
challenges may be, and what national capacities will be needed to address them.  
While there have been some challenges regarding managing EOD-related information within 
UNMIL, the way in which external actors recognised these and subsequently reacted in a 
proactive manner deserves specific mention.Identification of shortfalls in available EOD 
information resulted in an UNMAS decision to fund an AOAV intern to conduct further analysis of 
UNMIL data. Greater clarity was created on the extent, nature and geographical location of ERW 
contamination.  
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Effective collaboration  
Effective collaboration between national actors (MoD), AFL and LNP) and international actors 
(UNMIL, UNMAS, AOAV and Operation Onward Liberty (OOL) etc.) as well as among 
international actors has clearly resulted in useful information-sharing and coordination. This, in 
turn, has had a positive impact on capacity development activities.  
 
Main challenges and lessons learnt  
Most challenges presented below are not unique to Liberia’s capacities to address residual 
contamination. They are broader issues that the country faces as a consequence of its long civil 
war, affecting the Liberian state-building process in several ways. Specific challenges in the 
Liberian context include: 
 
UNMIL – missed opportunity?  
UNMIL has been responsible for EOD since its establishment in 2003. Lack of detailed EOD 
data prior to 2012 means there is limited documentation of the nature and extent of 
contamination during these first eight years. Training and involving AFL and LNP in EOD-related 
activities was not an explicit aspect of UNMIL's mandate. Arguably, however,, UNMIL missed a 
good opportunity to include national counterparts in EOD to a greater extent, in the interest of 
developing national capacities.  EOD was eventually included in the UNMIL transition plan in 
2013.  
 
Information management   
The LNP policy stipulates that reporting procedures and appropriate information management 
processes (including storage, analysis, sharing and reporting) will be important preconditions for 
any reporting structures to be effective. Effective information management will depend on solid 
collaboration and information-sharing between the key actors, including between AFL and LNP.  
 
Reporting structures 
Development of the LNP policy is an important first step; it allows for transparency and 
accountability regarding reporting structures, while stipulating the roles and responsibilities of the 
LNP and AFL. Potential future challenges relate to the actual adherence to, and implementation 
of, the policy. AOAV’s support in developing the LNP ToT plan was planned and implemented 
with sustainability in mind. The extent to which it will be implemented will, however, depend on 
available resources, the level of commitment and an effective chain of command.  
 
Future availability of resources  
Future availability, and effective and efficient management, of equipment and resources will be 
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Arms embargo 
Future EOD activities will rely on availability of necessary equipment, including explosives for 
demolition activities. Given the arms embargo imposed on Liberia, necessary explosives must 
be procured and safely stored in compliance with sanctions committee requirements.32 Some 
stakeholders expressed concern that it may be challenging for Liberia to do so in an effective 
and independent manner. 
 
Securing funding when working with national security services  
The UNMAS Liberia programme is unique in many ways, including its primary focus on capacity 
development of a national army. Working with security services is necessary in the transition 
context of Liberia, with UNMIL gradually reducing its presence and capacity. UNMAS has 
experienced great challenges in securing funding because it is working with the army. It 
perceives a great reluctance among donors to fund any activities that involve training security 
services. This reluctance represents a key challenge for successfully implementation of similar 
projects in the future.  
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 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1521/  
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Annexes  
Annex I: Individuals interviewed   
Name Title Organisation 
Seeye Abraha Hagos SSR Advisor UNDP  
Lindsay Harkness Programme Officer UNMAS 
Sheila Black Programme Manager UNMAS 
James M. Fromayan Chairman Liberia National Commission on 
Small Arms (LiNCSA) 
Benietta Jarbo Coordinator 
Saint Jerome Larbelee Deputy Minister, Operations Ministry of National Defense 
Kris Kwam Major Operation Onward Liberty 
US Mission in Liberia 
Jed Bauch Major 
Michael Page SSR Advisor UNMIL 
Timo Rusanen  Senior Force ATO UNMIL 
Muchiri Murenga UNMIL Transition OSRSG/UNMIL 
Col Prince Johnson  Brigade Commander  AFL 
Bart Laan Senior Reform Advisor UNMIL  
Miguel Gonzalez UNPOL Team Leader 
Cesar Hawthorne R. Binag Deputy Police 
Commissioner 
Christopher Robert Deputy Commander  Protection Support Unit, Liberia 
National Police 
Joyce G Cassell - Frankfort Programme Manager Justice and Security Joint 
Programme, Ministry of Justice 
Brig. General Daniel D. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 
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Ziankhan 
Col Eric Dennis Deputy Chief of Staff  
Kamil K. Kamaluddeen Country Director UNDP 
Fredrick Amplah Advisor on Compliance and 
Partnership 
John Balding  EOD Project Manager Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) 
Samuel Opoku-Agyakwa OiC Legal Policy  reform 
Section and Ministry of 
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Annex II: National Capacities and Residual Contamination Study TOR 
National capacities & residual contamination study 
Background  
National ownership is a central principle in the global mine action approach, and is reflected in 
international conventions and standards. As an increasing number of mine/ERW affected 
countries are approaching the “completion” stage of clearing all known contaminated areas, the 
issue of national ownership and that of developing sustainable capacities to deal with residual 
contamination becomes more central.  
This project will examine the topic of national capacities and residual contamination through 
documenting processes, providing recommendations and offering targeted, country specific 
guidance on the development of sustainable capacities to deal with residual contamination.  
Objectives and deliverables 
Desired outcomes  
The anticipated outcomes of the project are: 
1. Relevant national and international stakeholders have a better understanding of good 
practices and key challenges related to sustainable capacities to deal with residual 
contamination 
2. Relevant stakeholders’ capabilities to develop sustainable capacities to deal with residual 
contamination are strengthened  
3. Greater understanding of the role of national security services in dealing with residual 
contamination.  
Research objectives 
The sustainable national capacities and residual contamination study missions will be conducted 
in 2013 – 2014. Findings from these missions will be used to produce country case studies and 
a guide. The purpose of the guide will be to present key issues and to provide clear guidance on 
the development of sustainable national capacities to deal with residual contamination. The 
specific objectives of the guide will be to: 
 Review the different types and phases of the development of sustainable, national capacities 
to deal with residual contamination; 
 Document processes and examples from a selected number of countries, to highlight 
lessons learnt, specific challenges and good practices; 
 Document examples from countries that are currently in the process of developing national 
capacities to address residual contamination, to highlight what works, identify possible gaps, 
and make recommendations for improvement; 
 Assess what has/has not worked well, key factors to consider and lessons learned; 
 Identify the key steps in planning for, and developing, national capacities; 
 Based on the case study findings, formulate conclusions and recommendations in the form 
of practical, user-friendly guidance on the topic. 
Study products 
The project will have the following study outputs: 
 Country case studies   
 A Guide on National Capacities to Address the Residual Contamination 
Target audience 
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The research products will specifically target: NMAAs/MACs, national security services, relevant 
ministries, international and national organisations, relevant UN agencies and donors.  
Key issues to be explored in country case studies 
1. Introduction and Overview of the country context  
 Brief introduction to the country  
 Origin, nature and scope of the ERW contamination problem.  
 Brief background to the establishment of the UN mission.  
 Current structure and status of EOD activities  
o level of national ownership 
o responsible actors (UNMIL, line ministries, national security services)?  
o Which international and national actors are involved in the clearance activities? 
o External support?  
 
2. History of the process of developing national capacities  
Describe the process of developing the national capacity to address residual contamination 
 What stakeholders are/were involved (national and international)? 
o Ministries? 
o Donors? 
o National and international operators? 
o Commercial companies? 
o Relevant UN agencies? 
 Key milestones 
 Is/Was the process part of a broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) process?  
 Do/Did specific plans/strategies/policies guide the process?  
 Do/Did a capacity development plan/strategy guide the process?  
 
3. Addressing residual contamination (for countries that have reached a “residual state”)  
Explore the following key issues:  
 Reporting channels (top-down: from community to security services)  
 Responsible actors? If more than one, describe the nature of the partnership 
 Nature of the residual contamination (items, depth, expected distribution) 
 The process of moving from a proactive to reactive/responsive phase  
 The scope of the responsibility of the national actor/s (does it include Armed Violence 
Reduction (AVR), Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW) and Physical Security and 
Stockpile Management (PSSM))? 
 Key aspects of the national risk management approach (if relevant)  
 Financial arrangements  
 Sustainability aspects  
 Are operations guided by any standards?  
 Responsiveness 
 Information management  
a. Reporting structures and reporting flows (from whom to whom?) 
b. Information database (where is it stored)  
c. Means of information sharing and dissemination (who has access to it?)  
 
4. Key findings: Good practices, main challenges and lessons learnt  
 Critically review the process of developing national capacities. Present and elaborate on 
key findings, good practices (success stories), and list challenges and issues that have 
been problematic (lessons learnt).  
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Interim Item Identification: 
Assessed Priority: Confirmed Priority:
Item Description:                              
(as per Reporting Person)
Item Location:                                 
(If different from above)
LNP First Responder 
(Name/Rank/No):
Safety Considerations Taken:
Verbal Report Initiated 
(time/to):
Action Taken by 
AFL:



















Preliminary Actions Taken (cordon/evacuation/emergency services/etc):
